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Jan 19, 2016 Employment Gap Age Groups LFPR
Jan 10, 2016 A look at the Employment Situation
Dec 30, 2015 Fed Funds Rate up 25 Basis points...so what?
Dec 15, 2015 Fed Funds on the rise? Has Yellen 'Fell-in'?
Oct 15, 2015 Labor Markets Seven years of misery
Oct 6, 2015 Sept: Horrible Month for Labor
Sept 30, 2015 The FED: Interest Rate Angst
Sept 11, 2015 FED on the Monetary Policy Front
July 31, 2015 Trade and Foreign Exchange Rates
July 20, 2015 Economic Growth?
July 10, 2015 Labor Picture by Age Group
July 2, 2015 Disastrous Month in Labor Rpt
June 19, 2015 Minimum Wage - Income Distribution
Jun 5, 2015 Encouraged Worker Effect
May 8, 2015 Updated Employment Situation for April
May 4, 2015 Languishing Labor Markets
Apr 7, 2015 LFPR Doldrums on the Labor Front
March 8, 2015 Less than Zero Interest Rates - Trade War
2014 Articles
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Dec 23, 2011 Revisionist History Depression
Dec 10, 2011 Depression & Now Part 1
Dec 5, 2011 Lies, Damned Lies, Statistics
Nov 16, 2011 Taxes Part 2
Nov 8, 2011 Taxes Pt 1
Nov 1, 2011 Demographics
Oct 12, 2011 Fed-FOMC
Oct 6, 2011 Fed's Operation Twist
Sep 30, 2011 What Price Bailouts?!
Sep 9, 2011 Trade Deficit - States
Sept 3, 2011 Unemployment Ongoing Challenge
August 22, 2011 Restricting Oil Supply
August 11, 2011 Credit Rating-Taxes
August 8, 2011 QE3? What to do?
Aug 5, 2011 Employment Update
August 1, 2011 Competitive Free Mkt Capitalism
July 26, 2011 Cradle of Democracy
July 16, 2011 Capital Ratios
July 10, 2011 Unemployment Again
July 1, 2011 QE2 Over-Apres Moi, le Deluge
June 11, 2011 Unemployment
June 8, 2011 Net Worth Collapse
May 18 2011 Credit Collapse '08-'10
May 15, 2011 Fed Miracle-Mayhem
May 10, 2011 Unemployment
Mar 30, 2011 Puppet Show
Mar 18, 2011 Locked-in-Effect
Mar 10, 2011 Bummer Days
Feb 12 2011 Inflation by Decontenting
Feb 6 2011 Unemployment
Jan 14 2011 Money Supply
Jan 12 2011 Trade Deficit
Jan 6 2011 Printing Press Myth
Dec 18, 2010 College Pricing
Dec 7 2010 Debt & Deficits
Dec 2, 2010 J-Laffer Curve
Sep 24 2010 Competition
Sept 23 2010 Trade Deficit China
Introduction
About us
Links of Interest
Straw Poll
Definitions & Miscellaneous
 

Economic Newsletter for the New Millennium

October 6, 2011

Editor
Donald R. Byrne, Ph.D.
dbyrne5628@aol.com  

Associate Editor
Edward T. Derbin, MA, MBA
edtitan@aol.com  

Download Current Blog (soon)



THE NEW DANCE AT THE FED…AND IT IS NOT THE SHAKE, RATTLE, AND ROLL; IT IS A NEW VERSION OF THE NUDGE AND TWIST, BUT WITH THE BENNY BERNANKE ORCHESTRA


The Fed recently announced that it would ‘twist’ the yield curve http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/20110921a.htm   
 

“The Committee intends to purchase, by the end of June 2012, $400 billion of Treasury securities with remaining maturities of 6 years to 30 years and to sell an equal amount of Treasury securities with remaining maturities of 3 years or less.  This program should put downward pressure on longer-term interest rates and help make broader financial conditions more accommodative.”



No it is not a new idea.  The FED did so on at least one previous occasion.  Let’s take a short stroll down memory lane.


Back in 1960-1961, a recession had set in during which we were in need of easing our deficit in our Current Account Balance in our balance of Payments.  Lord Keynes’ ideas were still very dominant among economic policy makers.  Lower interest rates were needed to stimulate interest sensitive spending such as that on investment.  But that would lessen the net inflow of foreign capital from abroad making it more difficult to finance the Current Account deficit and would also put upward pressure on interest rates in the U.S. of A financial markets.  To borrow a phrase from our old friend Winnie the Pooh, Oh dear, what to do? 


The geniuses at the FED (Federal Reserve System, specifically the FOMC), our central bank and custodian of monetary policy, thought long and hard till the light bulb of success went on and to paraphrase Professor Higgins in the My Fair Lady, I think they got it…by George they have got it!.  What did they have?  Yes sireee, Operation Twist.  Some also called it Operation Nudge, and here is the way it was to work.
 

The FED would use open market operations to invert the yield curve which is the graph of the term structure of interest rates.  They would put downward pressure on long term interest rates to stimulate investment and the economy while at the same time drive up short term interest to maintain the net inflow of capital from abroad for balance of payments purposes.  Eureka!!  

 

Recall that the FED had more recently tried to institute a similar policy, but to Alan Greenspan’s frustration, a “conundrum” occurred [THE BALLAD OF ALAN GREENSPAN: TO DREAM THE IMPOSSIBLE DREAM (June 8, 2011) http://www.econnewsletter.com/66401/64201.html].  The FED failed to drive down the long term interest rates that it had worked so hard over the previous few years to drive up; in order to control what Greenspan referred to as “irrational exuberance” the cause of which he argued was the result of the “wealth effect”.  The “irrational exuberance” also caused asset bubbles that would have made Lawrence Welk green with envy.



We are now stalled in what some are calling the Great Recession, a major cause of which was the FED’s pricking the asset bubbles such as that in residential housing.  Is this progress, from “irrational exuberance” to “rational frustration”?  We do not need enemies when we have such friends.  Maybe the Austrian school zealots are right after all!


You might find it helpful to peruse our previous newsletters where we discussed the determinants of the term structure of interest rates (the graph of which is the yield curve).


Miracles or Mayhem:  What is the Federal Reserve really doing???

(May 15, 2011)

http://www.econnewsletter.com/73901/58201.html 

 
Excessive Subprime Lending; or Misguided Monetary Policy – A Reasoned Critique (August 2007)

http://byrned.faculty.udmercy.edu/2007%20Volume,%20Issue%202/2007%20Volume%20Issue%202.htm

“The Expectations Hypothesis Analysis of the Term Structure of Interest Rates argues that the current long-term interest rates are heavily influenced by the expected future short-term interest rates.  In the absence of liquidity bias, long-term (really all rates except the very shortest) interest rates are the geometric average of expected future short-term interest rates.  For example, the geometric average of 3, 4, and 6 is the cube root of their product or the cube root of 72 = 4.16.  Simply put, if the market consensus believes that short-term interest rates will rise in the future, the current long-term interest rates should be higher than the current short-term interest rates and the yield curve should slope up and to the right.  Conversely, if the market consensus believes that short-term interest rates will fall in the future, the yield curve should slope down and to the right and short-term interest rates should be higher than long-term interest rates.”


Greenspan’s frustration with what he termed a conundrum, was due to the mistaken belief of the FED that by driving down short term interest rates, the longer term interest rates would also like Humpty Dumpty, come falling down.  Alas, they did not do so.  As we explained in an earlier article on this website, while the Fed has awesome power to influence interest rates, it must do so thru open market operations, the buying and selling of securities in its portfolio in order to overwhelm the expectations of the market as to what they believe short term interest rates will do over the future. 

Recall that according to the dominant theory of the yield curve, the expectations theory, longer term interest rates are the geometric average of what the consensus of the market believes will be the future behavior of short term interest rates over the relevant period in question.

Unless the FED enters the market and buys or sells the appropriate maturities, the expectations of the market consensus will prevail.  An analogous situation existed during the period of the Bretton Woods fixed exchange rate system from just after the Second World War until it collapsed in the early 1970s.  

 
The U.K. had trouble maintaining the agreed upon peg which they tried to maintain by selling Dollars and buying British Pounds.  They ran out of Dollars and other things such as gold to buy the Pounds which were in excess supply at the agreed upon pegged rate.  Their inability to maintain the peg led them to devalue the pound, i.e. to change the peg (depreciate the Pound or cheapen its price in terms of the Dollar) so that the quantity supplied of Pounds was no longer in excess of the demanded for Pounds.  The Dollar appreciated as a result and the Dollar price of the Pound fell several times from its long standing $5.00 per Pound Sterling.  

 
Such occurrences were not conundrums then and are not now.  We know why they happen!


The Laffer Curve and the J-Curve are Analytically like Two Peas in a Pod (December 2, 2010)

http://www.econnewsletter.com/73901/3585.html  

When the U.K. was experiencing large and persistent deficits in its Trade Balance in the Post WWII era, even as a member of the fixed exchange rate system often referred to as the Breton Woods IMF Fixed Exchange Rate System, they were allowed to devalue the British Pound (equivalent to depreciating the Pound in a floating exchange rate system) on a few occasions.  Net foreign exchange earnings initially fell, as the Pound value of their trade deficit increased...

The argument revolved around the issue of whether the then current exchange rate was above an unstable equilibrium.  In this range, due to a backward bending supply curve for foreign exchange, a price increase for the dollar (due to devaluing the Pound which means increasing the Pound price of the Dollar) would increase the shortage of Dollars, not decrease that shortage. 

Some argued that the British pound should be revalued upward and not devalued.  

 
As we have argued in recent articles on this web site, what is needed is more certainty that the tax climate will improve, that market such as those for oil and derivative products such as gasoline will become more competitive and less directed by environmental concerns based on bad science and faulty economic reasoning, that the financial system and the Federal Reserve system will be purged of the influence of the investment banking gang.  Increased taxes for an unpopular health care program, more taxes to redistribute income, and more taxes to bail out the losers who have often forgotten the bounds of imprudent risk taking, will only serve to continue the economic malaise we are now suffering. 

Strategic defaults, short sales of family housing, lengthening durations for unemployment, a U-6 unemployment of around 16%, a rising sovereign risk of the U.S. debt, and in general, fiddling while the economy burns, has caused us to coin a new term, TITANICY- or Titanacy, if you prefer.  It is the increased federal spending and the resulting higher federal government debt with the threat of higher taxes that only keeps our economy bumping along the bottom of the ocean of economic malaise as documentary after documentary describes the condition of the ill-fated Titanic. 

Counting the economic rivets that have popped as the U.S. economy sunk into this Great Recession, like the Titanic, will not refloat the economy as it will not refloat the Titanic!  Telling us that we must pass his so called jobs bill NOW (read it later), when it consists of the same infertile schemes of the last two and one half years, is an act of TITANICY.